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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 04-3265
                    
EVA WHITSETT, On Behalf of Ciera Whitsett,
                                      Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-03510
District Judge:  The Honorable Joel A. Pisano
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 7, 2005  
                    
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
                    
(Opinion Filed: May 16, 2005)
                    
OPINION
                    
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Eva Whitsett appeals from a final order of the District Court which upheld a
determination by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
2(“Commissioner”) that Whitsett’s daughter, Ciera, was not “disabled” within the meaning
of the Social Security Act (“Act”).  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3); we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Because there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s
determination, we conclude that Whitsett’s claim for Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) benefits on behalf of her daughter was properly denied.  Accordingly, we will
affirm.
I.
The parties are well acquainted with the factual and procedural background of this
case, and therefore we will limit our discussion of the record to those facts bearing
directly on our disposition of this appeal.  Ciera was receiving SSI benefits as of August
22, 1996 on the basis of a 1994 determination that she was a “disabled” minor.  At about
that time, Congress amended the Act’s definition of “disabled” for individuals under the
age of 18, and required disability redeterminations for a certain class of existing
beneficiaries, which included Ciera.
Pursuant to this change in legislation, the SSA informed Whitsett on November 12,
1998 that she would need to provide updated information to demonstrate that Ciera was
then disabled.  Whitsett failed to provide the information, and on July 13, 1999, the
Commissioner issued a Cessation of Benefits notice.  Following an adverse decision upon
reconsideration by a Disability Hearing Officer, Whitsett requested a hearing before an
     This determination became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals1
Council denied Whitsett’s request for review. 
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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  After several adjournments, the ALJ conducted a
hearing on July 31, 2002, receiving testimony from both Whitsett and Ciera.  On October
24, 2002, the ALJ concluded that Ciera was not disabled as of November 1998 and,
therefore, was ineligible for SSI benefits.1
Engaging in the three-step sequential analysis for determining child disability, see
20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d), the ALJ found that Ciera was not engaged in substantial
gainful activity and that her hypotonia, developmental delay, and learning disorder
amounted, collectively, to a severe impairment.  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that
Ciera satisfied the first two prongs of § 416.924.  At the third and final step of the
evaluation, however, the ALJ determined that Ciera’s severe impairment did not meet,
medically equal, or functionally equal any of the listings (“listings”) in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1.  On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Ciera was not disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
II.
On review, our task is to determine whether the District Court properly concluded
that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.  42 U.S.C. §
405(g); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).  Substantial evidence means
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
     Whitsett refers to the functional equivalency determination as a separate (i.e. fourth)2
step in the disability analysis.  For purposes of this opinion, we will follow the approach
of both the District Court and the ALJ and treat that determination as a subset of the third
step in the analysis.    
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conclusion.”  Jones, 364 F.3d at 503 (internal quotations omitted).  Also guiding our
analysis is Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981), and its progeny, which impose
upon the ALJ an obligation to set forth the bases for his decision, including his reasons
for discounting probative evidence in the record which contradicts his findings.  See, e.g.,
Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2001); Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
220 F.3d 112, 119-21 (3d Cir. 2000).  At bottom, the Cotter doctrine ensures that a
reviewing court will be capable of evaluating whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.  Unless the ALJ sets forth his reasoning, we have
observed, “the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not
credited or simply ignored.”  Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705.
III.
Whitsett relies heavily (if not exclusively) on Cotter, arguing that the ALJ was
derelict in his duty to set forth a detailed explanation for his findings at step three of the
sequential analysis.   We disagree.  To support his finding that Ciera’s combination of2
impairments did not meet or medically equal the listings, the ALJ identified the specific
listings which he had considered and evaluated the factual record in a manner which
closely tracked the elements of the relevant listings.  While the ALJ did not explicitly set
5forth the requirements for each listing, we have never required such a formalistic
approach under the Cotter line of cases.  See Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (observing that the
ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in
conducting his analysis”).
Similarly unavailing is Whitsett’s challenge to the ALJ’s functional equivalence
determination.  The ALJ cited the appropriate standard, listed the six domains which he
was obliged to analyze, and defined the terms “marked” and “extreme”.  Thereafter, the
ALJ engaged in a three-plus page discussion of the factual record, setting forth a
substantially comprehensive account of both the medical and lay testimony in the case,
before reaching his conclusion that Ciera did not have even a marked limitation in any of
the six domains.  Although admittedly the ALJ could have adopted a more organized
approach (for example, by making clear which pieces of evidence he was considering in
connection with each of the relevant domains), we find that his decision enabled us to
perform our function of meaningful judicial review, and was therefore in compliance with
Cotter.
Having rejected Whitsett’s challenge under Cotter, we are required to determine
whether the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.  Based upon
our independent review of the record, we conclude that it was.  We note, in this
connection, that Whitsett has failed to point to any contrary evidence which was either
improperly discredited or ignored by the ALJ.
6IV.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
